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Panel IV - "Can the West Learn from the
Rest?" - The Chinese Legal Order's
Hybrid Modernityt
By NICHOLAS CALCINA HOWSON*

I am asked to present on the "shortcomings of the Western
model of legality based on a professionalized, individualistic and
highly formalistic approach to justice" as a way to understanding if
"the West can develop today a form of legality which is relational
rather than based on litigation as a zero sum game, learning from
face to face social organizations in which individuals understand the
law" - presumably in the context of the imperial and modem
Chinese legal systems which I know best as a scholar and have lived
for many years as a resident of the modem identity of the center of
the "Chinese world," the People's Republic of China ("PRC"). The
task is difficult, if only because of the collection of assumptions and
stereotypes embedded in the question offered to our panel, and
t Remarks from The West and the Rest in Comparative Law, 2008 Annual
Meeting of the American Society of Comparative Law, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law (Oct. 2-4, 2008).
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which must be challenged: For instance, is there a unified "Western"
model of legality? Is there a unified "Chinese world" (or "Asian" or
Is the Western model truly
"Confucian") model of legality?
characterized by any of a "professionalized," "individualistic" or
"highly formalistic" approach to the (unelaborated and deeply
seductive notion of) "justice?" Is that part of the "Rest" which is the
Chinese world not professionalized, individualistic or formalistic
(and if not, to what degree)? Is the Chinese-world model in its
modern iteration in any real sense "relational" or based on face-toface social organizations, etc.? Are any of these characterizations
about evidently dynamic systems so static that they can be
proclaimed and examined in detail as if a butterfly captured under a
jar?
Obviously, in posing these questions I am asking that there be
significant and continuing re-appraisals of the models we seek to
contrast, or at least the way we perceive and talk about these
different systems. Our colleague Teemu Ruskola has written
beautifully on these problems specifically with respect to
comparative law and the Chinese tradition, elaborating on Bill
Alford's searing critique of Roberto Unger's misconceptions of
traditional (even pre-imperial) Chinese-world legality, governance
and philosophy.' Perhaps the only thing I can offer to warm the
hearts of comparative law scholars is the assurance that there is real
difference between the Chinese-world idea of legality and legal
system, on one side, and other distinct traditions and architectures,
on the other side - whether it be the Anglo and American traditions
so easily lumped together, the French - and perhaps distinct German world civil law systems (and as elaborated by imperial Russia), the
modern and contemporary Japanese overlay of aspects of German
law (as subsequently diverted by the post-World War II American
inheritance/imposition), etc. Identifying those differences, trying to
understand how distinct legal orders represent varied politicalreligious and economic cultures in a certain place at a certain time,
and comparing the understandings we can only tentatively divine,
is at the center of what we call the pursuit of "comparative law."

1. William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Oriental? Implications of Roberto Unger's
Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 915, 915-72 (1986); Teemu
Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 179-234 (Oct. 2002); ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL

THEORY 86-126 (Free Press 1976).
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With respect to transitional (post-Mao) China, these differences
are not merely of intellectual interest, but of critical moment for
China's contemporary development of a "rule of law state" (fazhi
guojia).2 This is exemplified in Professor He Weifang's September
17, 2008, cri de coeur against one pernicious throw-back idea now in
vogue in the PRC: judicial "reform" leading to "mass line" justice
and judicial procedure. Faced with corrosive assertions - emanating
from the heights of the court bureaucracy in Beijing no less - about
the "true" nature of the Chinese judiciary and how it should
function in a more "democratic" (read mass-line "revolutionary")
fashion, He Weifang answers with immense passion and coherence
on the side of a judiciary characterized by professionalism,
specialization, technical competence, autonomy, predictability, and
objectivity. 3 Most importantly for this meeting, He Weifang argues
in this fashion not because he identifies some excavated or everpresent and uniquely "Chinese" tradition, or conversely a tradition
that is not Western or liberal democratic, but because the judiciary
he aspires to have for China is a necessary building block for a future
normative vision: a slightly more democratic and accountable
polity, and real, or "thicker" rule of law. Thus, He Weifang employs
the tools of comparative law and comparative analysis to conjure a
compelling prescription for a future vision of the Chinese legal
system as it can work in the modern PRC - not as it is condemned or
determined to work by what one deeply pessimistic Sinologist
4
called the "tyranny of [China's] history."
With these disclaimers and exhortations out of the way, let me
now engage in the same kind of synthetic abstraction I critique
above, and offer our panel a few aspects which I think characterize
the Chinese legal tradition in all its diversity: From imperial times,
to the post-Opium Wars encounter with one idea of "modernity,"
and then to the contemporary legal systems as they function in postReform and Opening to the Outside World PRC and post-military
2. A rhetorical formulation nicely contrasted with the similar-sounding
Chinese phrase "yifa zhiguo" which, in the most benign translation, is "ruling the
country in accordance with law," but in my view signals a longer tradition that is
the opposite of "rule of law" - "rule by law."
3. He Weifang, Sifa gaige de nanti yu chulu [Difficulties and the Way Out for
JudicialReforn], NANFANG ZHOUMOU [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Sept. 17,2008, at E31.
4. W. J.F. JENNER, THE TYRANNY OF HISTORY: THE RooTS OF CHINA'S CRISIS, CH.
7: THE LAW 129-53 (The Penguin Press 1992).
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rule Republic of China on Taiwan. My idea here is to offer ideas
which I believe are still at work in the design, implementation and
enforcement of the modem Chinese legal-political system.
However, I will focus less on the present-day legal system as it
functions in the PRC, because that legal system is not only so clearly
in the process of development, but also because it partakes of
radically different styles of operation in different contexts - for
instance, criminal law and procedure, rights and rule of law
discourse (constitutional law), administrative law and bureaucratic
regulation, corporate and commercial law application in an
increasingly (truly) "marketized" economy, etc. Thus, I do not
propose to repeat here what I am convinced are deeply misleading
generalizations about China's (or Taiwan's) membership in the
"civil law" family (dalu faxi) of nations, precisely because China's
affiliation with a "civil law" system of law and governance is so
contradicted by its deep engagement with a hybrid accommodation
dictated by globalization and global capital markets, economic
reform, international trade, and the imperatives of social control in a
volatile and seemingly valueless society. (One example that leaps to
mind, and has been central to my research, is China's reception and
implementation of essentially Anglo-American, common law type,
corporate law standards applied ex post, which is the necessary
result of globalized capital markets, the introduction of new
business organizations, and asked-for formal (versus functional)
convergence. 5 Even the PRC State Council agrees with the view that
the contemporary PRC legal system is a potpourri of formerly
distinct systems. In its February 2008 White Paper, China's Efforts
and Achievements in Promoting the Rule of Law, it directly and
correctly rebuts the constant and erroneous assertion of China's
membership in the civil law system (at least with respect to formal
legislation):
China pays attention to making reference to and learning from
other countries' experience in legislation. In the field of civil and
commercial legislation, the basic systems of both common law
countries and continental law countries have influenced the
general principles of civil law, as well as the contract and the
property laws, and inspiration has been drawn from the spirit of
5. Nicholas Howson, The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name: AngloAmerican Fiduciary Duties in China's 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of
Prior Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 193-254
(Hideki Kanda, Kon-sik Kim, & Curtis Milhaupt eds., Routledge 2008).
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the principles of private law and legislation applicable throughout
the world ...

and

China has adopted the principle of legal certainty

the principle of proportionality

administrative law ....

applicable in modem

The Criminal Law and the Criminal

Procedure Law have adopted the basic principles and spirit of the
law applicable in other countries ....

Regarding legislation for the

protection of intellectual property rights and environmental
protection, China has also learned much from foreign
6
experience.
Anyone who has studied or dealt with the Chinese legal system, or
lived or practiced in it, knows that the State Council is underselling
the hybridity of China's legal system melting pot.
All of the above being true, there is however an identifiable
Chinese tradition of law and legality in history, no matter how
contested its outlines may be. What are some of the key ways we
can understand that distinct Chinese legal tradition, especially in
contrast to "the West" and other regions comprising "the Rest" and
as a way to comprehend what it may have to teach us? To answer
that overly broad question, we first need to come to terms with the
various ways in which a legal system works, or interacts, both with
those who rule and those who are the subjects of rule. I, perhaps
artificially, think of at least three separate spheres of application
(which are close to distinctions made by historian Philip Huang in
examining the late Qing and early Republican Chinese legal
orders): 7 (i) formal statute and regulation, and formal institutional
structures; (ii) the way in which the law actually works in practice,
or how it is applied, referred to, and enforced, by the various
institutions of authority in society; and (iii) perceptions of the
system by the "consumers" of it, both formal aspects and
experienced/applied aspects (and by both those who use it, and
those who are governed by it).

6. State Council White Paper, China's Efforts and Achievements in Promoting the
Rule of Law, Feb. 28, 2008 at 30.
7. Huang addresses "code," "custom" and "practice" with respect to the Qing
(Manchu) legal establishment. My trinity is certainly concerned with "code" and
"practice" but relegates the specific concern with "custom" to something included
in perceptions and experience. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CODE, CUSTOM, AND LEGAL
PRACTICE IN CHINA: THE QING AND THE REPUBLIC COMPARED, LAW, SOCIETY, AND
CULTURE IN CHINA (Stanford University Press 2001).
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So, let me now offer, in a perhaps scattershot way, different
aspects of the Chinese tradition of law, legality, and governance as I
perceive them:
Formal "law" (fa in the modem idiom, lu in imperial times) was
"moralized" 8 and understood as an expression of perfect, or
aspired-to, order, rather than substantive, to be applied, law or
regulation binding on any actor in society. In the words of still one
of the best scholars of the imperial legal system, formal law (lu) was
largely "the embodiment of the ethical norms of Confucianism." 9 A
review of the imperial legal system, and the application (or nonapplication) of the lu shows this. One of the best concrete
expressions of this dynamic I know is the imperial edict by the Yong
Zheng Emperor, declaring that the provision on the ba yi ("Eight
Special [Criminal] Procedures" for classes of people deemed worthy
under Confucian principles) must remain at the very front of the
imperial Penal Code, just as it had from the Tang Dynasty in the
seventh century, but that the system of preferential procedures for
Confucian-privileged social actors could not actually be
implemented because of the stronger imperatives of state
administration. Here the Emperor himself declares explicitly that the
fully Confucianized "law" must remain in the Code, but would not
be applied and would in fact be contradicted in favor of an explicitly
Legalist approach (more equal application of punishments and
rewards). Consistent with this use of law and legal procedure was
the public, didactic, nature of criminal proceedings before the
magistrate in imperial times - meant not as contests over truth and
culpability, but exercises in teaching and exhorting the correct
application of the moral order. This rhetorical "formalization" of
law (as opposed to its being made "functional"), and the didactic,
even propagandistic, function of public proceedings, are aspects of
China's legal tradition which have strong resonance in the modern
Chinese world.

8. "Confucianized" per Qu Tongzu's influential view of 1948. CH'O T'UNGTSu, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA, (Mouton & Co., rev. ed. 1965),
expansion and English translation of Qu TONGZU, ZHONGGUO FALU ZHI RUJIAHUA [THE
CONFUCIANIZATION OF CHINESE LAW] (1948), in GUOLI BEIJING DAXUE WUSHI ZHOUNIAN
JINIAN LUNWENJI [COLLECTED PAPERS IN CELEBRATION OF THE 50rH ANNIVERSARY OF
STATE-ESTABLISHED PEKING UNIVERSITY] (Peking University Publishing House 1948).

9. Derk Bodde, Basic Concepts of Chinese Law: The Genesis and Evolution of Legal
Thought in Traditional China, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
SOCIETY 375, 376 (1963).
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This idea should give us a clue as to the work-horses of the
imperial legal system, in terms of real, applied, law. If the law was
"moralized" or "Confucianized" and not meant to be applied, and
acknowledged as such, the state still needed recourse to specific
regulation or sub-statutes, and administrative pronouncements
(fagui in the modem idiom, 1i in the Qing Penal Code). Herein lay
the Legalist's secret victory over the Confucianist's apparent
domination of the legal-political landscape. For, it was the 1i which
were promulgated with the idea that they would have real effect
and actually be enforced (or describe the relative rights and duties
of citizens and bureaucratic actors). The extraordinary work of Qing
officials and legal reformers Shen Jiaben and Xue Yunsheng show
the ways in which the functioning legal system was rooted in the
sub-statutory world, a system which sometimes stood in stark
opposition to the commands of the formal legal system or deeply
moralized Penal Codes. But what is important about this insight,
for the modern Chinese legal system, is the apparent willingness of
the polity to accommodate this kind of contradiction - a Confucian,
formalized, settlement of law, alongside a Legalist, implemented,
structure of governance norms.
At the same time, "law" and the legal order was (and until
recently continued to be) strongly associated with punishment and
the harsh, coercive, aspects of the government. This is captured by
the overwhelming use in Chinese legal history not of the character
"fa" in connection with the legal system, but the character "xing"
which speaks to punishments meted out by a strong ruler and his
subordinates. This does not mean that we are forced to think of the
legal order in action as synonymous with cruel tyrants slow-slicing
those who have offended against heaven and the Emperor, but
instead a system of law which did not - at least traditionally accommodate "rights-bearing" law, i.e., law that carried with it
rights against other non-state actors much less the state itself.
Assuredly, other private actors, and the imperial court itself, had
obligations and duties, and private actors had some rights of
enforcement or appeal, but those rights were not clearly embedded
in "law" and the legal system. Only with China's encounter with
the West and Meiji Japan in the late 19th century has the idea of
"rights-bearing" law (in private and public law, and later public
international law) become something of relevance.
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An associated vision holds that if the "law" wasn't meant to be
applied, and a body of subsidiary administrative regulation was
most relevant to the vagaries of everyday, real, life, then the real
governance work in society was done by other important norms and
institutions. As Professor Bodde summarized the long-standing
view:
... in China, perhaps even more than in most other civilizations,
the ordinary man's awareness and acceptance of such norms was
shaped far more by the pervasive influence of custom than by any
formally enacted system of law. The clan into which he was born,
the guild of which he might become a member, the group of
gentry elders holding the informal sway in his rural community these and other extra-legal bodies helped to smooth the inevitable
frictions in Chinese society by inculcating moral precepts upon
their members, mediating disputes, or, if need arose, imposing
disciplinary sanctions and penalties.' 0
There is no doubt that in traditional China, and in the contemporary
governance order, much was and is accomplished via extra-legal
system institutions (broadly defined). My view however is that this
idea may have been oversold, by foreign and Chinese analysts alike,
perhaps enamored of something "other" or non-Western. I say this
after review of literally hundreds of Qing and Ming dynasty legal
cases, the certainty that some of these extra-legal institutions - like
clan or guild - allowed appeals outside into the formal magistrate's
and provincial court system, and doubts about the provenance of
19th and twentyth century surveys of local "custom" undertaken by
the Republican governments or the Japanese colonial governments
in Taiwan or mainland China. Whatever the truth of the matter, and
as difficult as it is to generalize about a reality which was no doubt
wildly different throughout the Chinese world, we are still left with
the strong perception of this aspect of legal pluralism, which as with
the things noted above, has strong resonance in the Chinese world
today.
Perhaps most important in this string of generalizations is the
fact that the dynastic legal system was explicitly about two things:
(i) social control or the administration of society in the service of
stability, and (ii) control and management of the bureaucratic
apparatus (magistrates to provincial Governors to the Board of
Punishments and other central organs) which administered the
10. Id.
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realm on behalf of the Emperor.
With regard to the first kind of control - social control - the
formal legal system was an adjunct to a number of tested
mechanisms: local custom, national customary procedures, liyi,
philosophy, superstition, religious belief, art and representation,
education and public education (verging on moral education), etc."
(As noted above, I take issue with accepted notions as to the degree
to which these other extra-legal institutions functioned, to the
exclusion of the formal legal system, in traditional China.) This
diversity of norms and application of norms was a result of the
equally diverse sources of authority, at least from the vantage point
of the consumers of the governance system, ranging from the
imperial dynasty, the subsidiary levels of the imperial government
(to the magistrate), clan, family, tribe (for non-Han peoples), village,
guild, etc. Indeed, many writers have discussed China's historical
"legal pluralism," addressing both the multiplication of norms and
norm-applying institutions, but also the continued use (at least in
the Qing dynasty) of Manchu, Mongol, Central Asian, Tibetan, etc.
legal systems and substantive law alongside the certifiably
"Chinese" (Tang-origin, Han pedigree) legal system. 12 As noted
above, and so often ignored in the literature, is the fact that there
were abundant intersections between these overlaid systems - for
example, where resolutions adjudicated in the clan or guild context
could be appealed to the local magistrate, i.e., into the formal state
13
system.
Whatever our final view of the interaction of these multiple
levels, we must understand the entirety of the Chinese legal system,
and certainly its expression in the dynastic Codes and application of
the Codes (and sub-statutes), as one dominated by its
overwhelmingly central mission: social control. Accordingly, if we
see the system as one dedicated to social control, it must then be a
legal-political system - a system which uses the law and legality as
instruments to administer, reduce and resolve contradictions, and
11. Shen Darning, "DA QING LU LI" YU QINGDAI DE SHEHUI KONGZHI ["THE GREAT
QING CODE" AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE QING DYNASTY] (Shanghai People's Press
2007).
12.

Dorothea Heuschert, Legal Pluralismin the Qing Empire: Manchu Legislationfor

the Mongols, 20 INT'L HISTORY REV. 310, 310-24 (1998).
13. Hu HSIEN-CHiN, THE COMMON DESCENT GROUP IN CHINA AND ITS FUNCTIONS
(Johnson Reprint Corp. 1964); SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN
MANCHU CHINA: A SOCOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 80-111 (The Athalone Press 1997).
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aid the power and authority of those administering. This then is a
top-down system, imposed and applied on the populace, mutable as
political-administrative policy requires, and thus not likely to confer
rights or powers on the subjects of the system. Thus, I say again that
it is a "political-legal" system, and not solely a "legal" order, as
exemplified
by China's continuing appellation of the same "zhengfa." 14 The negative corollary to this of course is that it
diminishes the autonomy of the law, and the legal system, at least in
the way it is separate, notionally or in application, from the political
authority of the day. This dovetailed nicely with the post-1949
Chinese Communist-era understanding of law, deeply influenced
by the (Russian) Soviet positivist theories of A. Y. Vyshinsky. Those
theories of law hold that in the pre-Revolutionary circumstance, the
law is but a normative expression of the will of the ruling class, and
formulated in the interests of that class; conversely, under Socialism,
the Communist Party represents the new rulers (the proletariat
under traditional Marxism, "all of the people" under Chinese
Communism) and should enjoy absolute control over the creation of
positive law by the organs of the Party-controlled "state" (and the
implementation of law by legal institutions also controlled by the
Party). 15
The founders of the PRC hewed fairly closely to
Vyshinsky's theoretical views, as mediated through pre-existing
Chinese (imperial-era) assumptions and expectations, thereby
depriving the PRC's law and legal system of any substantial
autonomy, or - said another way - irrevocably linking the "legal" to
the "political," and making the law almost wholly instrumental in
the service of state administration.
This theoretical view was fully embodied in the rhetoric of
Article 2 of the February 22, 1949, "Instruction of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee Regarding Discarding of the
Guomingdang's 'Six Codes' and Confirmation of Judicial Principles
for Liberated Areas," which abolished (China's first) 1947
Constitution along with the departed Nationalist government's
Criminal Code, Civil Code, Commercial Code, Civil Procedure Law,
and Criminal Procedure Law:
14. Law teaching institutions in China, formerly under the Ministry of Justice,
are institutes (now in the two cases "universities") of "Politics and Law" (zhengfa),
just as the internal committees which must pass on most adjudicated cases before
the People's Courts are "political legal committees" (zhengfawei).
15. Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 711, 720
(1994).
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The Six Codes are like most bourgeois laws, appearing with the
face of a so-called "everyone is equal before the law;" but in fact
there is no alignment of interests between the rulers and the ruled,
the oppressors and the oppressed, the propertied and the
property-less, or creditors and debtors, and accordingly there can
be no real equal legal power (faquan). Thus, the entire lot of the
Guomindang laws is only a tool to protect the rule of the landlord
and compradore bureaucratic bourgeoisie; they are a weapon
used to crush and bind the great masses. It is for just this reason
that Chiang Kai-shek in the death cry on the eve of his extinction
still asks that the false Constitution be kept ....16
So, as one PRC academic has written about China's tradition in
constitutional law (but really about the state of rule by law in
China):
...[the Chinese tradition] has never bestowed much respect on
the authority of the law, and the degree of respect given to law
has been determined completely according to whether or not it
aids the rulers in realizing their concrete aims. In this way, the
use of and respect given to law was shaped entirely in accordance
with specific circumstances and the individual preferences of
17
those in power.
Professor Xia means "the autonomy" of the legal order, rather than
its "authority" - for even with an entirely instrumental use, its
authority, in the right hands, is unchallenged. This has strong
implications for the substantive aspects of the contemporary
Chinese legal order, the institutions which implement it, and
perceptions of it by its consumers (and perceptions that are different
from the nightmare "xing" associations alluded to above).
On the second prong (control and management of the
bureaucratic apparatus), the formal law and legal system was long
threatened to be overcome and dominated by this use, leaving the
functioning governance and social control system to rely upon other
provinces of authority noted above. As Bill Jones wrote in the
introduction to his translation of the 1740 version of the Qing Code

16.

ZHONGGUO

XIANZHENG

WENXIAN

TONGBIAN

CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS COMPENDIUM (REV. ED.)]

(XIUDING

BAN)

[CHINA

279 (Wang Peiying ed., China

Democratic Legal System Publishing House 2007).
17. JINDAI ZHONGGUO XIANFA YU XIANZHENG YANJIU [CONTEMPORARY CHINA:
RESEARCH ON THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE] (Xia Xinhua

ed., China Legal Publishing House 2007) at 27.
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(attempting to distinguish the imperial Chinese legal system from
the development of Western Europe's "civil" law tradition):
The polity of China consisted of a highly centralized government
headed by an absolute ruler who ruled by means of a bureaucracy...
Consequently one would expect the imperial law or Code to take
note of human activity only as it was perceived to affect imperial
policies. It was natural that the primary focus of attention would
be the activities of bureaucrats in the performance of their duties,
not the activities of ordinary human beings in their private lives.
As one of the Tang emperors, Li Shimin, is supposed to have
remarked, The wise emperor governs his officials, he does not
govern the people ....The [Qing] code's point of view is shown
by the fact that over half its provisions are devoted to the
regulation of the official activities of government officials ....
The majority of the provisions were not only part of the code
addressed to district magistrates to enforce among those who
were in their jurisdiction as part of their administrative duties,
18
they also concerned the behavior of officials on the job.
Bill Jones is certainly correct in his overall characterization of the
Qing Code, and its great pre-occupation with the governance of
officials, not necessarily the governed. Nonetheless, we don't want
to make too much of his emphasis, if only because we know that as exemplified in the many case reports that can be reviewed and
savored from the Ming and Qing dynasties - those officials did use
the dynastic Penal Codes in relation to society and to vindicate or
refuse the claims of non-official civil actors, 19 just as bureaucratic
superiors (including the Emperor personally) used the Codes (and
separate administrative statutes) to hold lower level officials
accountable for misbegotten procedures, mis-application of the lu or
li,
negligent or corrupt behavior, and abuse of authority.
Finally, two accepted tropes regarding the traditional Chinese
legal order hold that (i) there was a strong aversion to appearances
in formal proceedings before the magistrate, and (ii) Chinese civil
actors avoided written commitments (enforceable at law) in most
dealings, preferring to seal and seek enforcement of various
arrangements via extra-legal institutions, whether clan, guild, or
temple, etc. I only say here that these are massive and perhaps
18. WILLIAM C. JONES, THE GREAT QING CODE: A NEW TRANSLATION WITH

INTRODUcTION 5-9 (Clarendon Press 1994).
19. PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CIVIL JUSTICE IN CHINA: REPRESENTATION AND PRACTICE IN
THE QING, LAW, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE IN CHINA (Stanford University Press 1996).
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obscuring over-generalizations and that there is now a great deal of
evidence that individuals in imperial China did enter the
magistrate's province seeking vindication of legal and moral rights
and interests often based on their perceptions of the dictates of
Chinese "law," although they were of course wise to avoid a
presence required in connection with what we would call criminal
proceedings. Again, Philip Huang's research from the late Qing
demonstrates this, 2 0 as does the several hundred years of official
railing against, and attempted regulation of, "litigation cudgels"
(songgun).21 The second assumption is also at variance with what we
now know about a good deal of formal contracting over many
aspects of civil and material life in imperial China, bargains and
rights reduced to writing and as often as not enforced before the
formal legal system (even if there was a prior "exhaustion of
remedies" Chinese-style).22 Accordingly, if we are looking to the
traditional legal system in China as something which evidences
popular fear and avoidance of formal legal proceedings, or
enforceable bargains of significant value and importance sealed on a
secret (family) handshake witnessed by a tribal elder, we are
misinformed.
So, to summarize, some of the things I perceive in the
traditional Chinese legal system and view of legality, and which
have some resonance today, are: the peculiar "moralized" character
of formal "law" in China; the didactic, moral norm - enforcing,
nature especially of criminal proceedings before the magistrate as
"agent" of the Emperor; the top-down and usually coercive
orientation of the legal order; the real, non-rhetorical, work done by
lesser, subordinate - or non-legal norms unburdened by the
aspirational, moralizing, requirements of apparently superior and
formally-declared norms; the hybridity and pluralism of the Chinese
20. Id.
21. My preferred translation, but rendered "litigation tricksters" by most
foreign writers. See Melissa Macauley, Civil and Uncivil Disputes in Southeast Coastal
China, 1723-1820, in CIVIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 85-121 (Kathryn
Bernhardt & Philip C.C. Huang eds., Stanford University Press 1994).
22. Myron L. Cohen, Writs of Passage in Late Imperial China: The Documentation of
Practical Understandings in Minong, Taiwan, in CONTRACT AND PROPERTY IN EARLY
MODERN CHINA 37-93 (Madeleine Zelin, Johnathan Ocko, & Robert Gardella eds.,
Stanford University Press 2004); MELISSA MACAULEY, SOCIAL POWER AND LEGAL
CULTURE: LITIGATION MASTERS IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (Stanford University Press
1998).
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legal order through successive dynasties (i.e., not just the non-Han
Yuan and Qing dynasties), and the accommodation of different
levels of application; the pretty complete subordination of the law
and the legal system to political-administrative imperatives; the
over-riding focus of the legal system on social control, and a
subsidiary focus on bounding the discretion and making
accountable subordinate levels of the bureaucracy; and finally a
system that - contrary to a good deal of "orientalizing" (including
sadly self-orientalizing) views of the matter - worked and engaged
with civil actors without leaving them entirely to extra-legal
institutions of clan, guild, village, etc. Of course there are many
other characterizations we could make about the inherited Chinese
legal order, but hopefully these will suffice in trying to determine
how that order, in its present-day form, can interact with what this
meeting calls "the West" (impossibly diverse, and equally difficult
to generalize about!). And make no mistake, as demonstrated by He
Weifang's recent public argument in favor of professionalized and
autonomous courts, these are issues which the architects of China's
new legal and political are concerned with this very day.
Is there something in this "Chinese" tradition of law for "the
West?" Many would argue that "the West" has already absorbed
the very best and useful aspect of the traditional Chinese "legal"
order - the modem administrative law state, that infatuation of mideighteenth century French philosophes who saw in China's meritselected and minutely regulated bureaucracy a perfect model for
competent and accountable administration in pre-Revolutionary
France. Yet - risking allegations of ethnocentrism and a particular
affection for liberal democratic, rule of law, legal political
establishments - I might hazard the view that the Chinese system
should and will move more towards some of the broad principles
which underlie "the West's" legal and political structures, rather
than the other way around. This may be only because China is
changing very profoundly, not to be just like "the West," but at least
to reward the increasingly rich political, emotional and material
expectations of its citizens. Sociologist C. K. Lee has studied
recourse to the formal legal system (as opposed to the pre-existing
Party or "danwei" system, or eventually into the streets in public
protest) in China for the many people with labor grievances,
whether in the sweatshops of Shenzhen and Dongguan, or those
laid off with economic reform and disbanding of China's stateowned enterprises in the Northeast. Her data show a remarkable
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difference in the recourse (legal vs. political) sought between
workers in the "Sunbelt" (the South) and the "Rustbelt"
(Manchuria), which contrast is directly related to the difference in
social, economic and political organization in those two areas.
Overall, she perceives in China a slow but steady transformation
from state and institutions based on an implicit (Socialist style (and
imperial era-style)) "social contract" to a traditional (Western) social
contract bounded by law, or "legal contract." The "social contract"
instituted in the Socialist era might be recalled as something close to
the imperial era's similar general and implicit exchange between the
paternalistic state and a politically acquiescent populace, with "no
legal document stipulating the terms of this socialist social contract,
only shifting policies that varied greatly according to the political
and economic needs of the state in different periods." 23 That former
social contract is being replaced, at least in some areas of China,
with a more explicitly legalized social contract, or a political
relationship that mimics economic, market and property
relationships in being defined by, and protected, by the legal order
coming into being. Professor Lee's work reminds us that the context
for China's legal order - both as proclaimed, and as lived - is
shifting rapidly before our very eyes, and towards a notion of
legality that is closer to a "Western" model than that ever before
broadly relevant in the huge expanse of China. He Weifang, cited at
the beginning of this writing, admits as much in describing the time
required for real judicial reform in China's transitional circumstance:
"Looking at this from the standpoint of history, China's
introduction of a Western [legal] system and construction of its own
modern legal order has only a century of history. Compared to our
very long history of autocratic rule, this [century] is but the shortest
of periods." 24 This, of course, is not the same thing as saying that
China is moving towards an explicitly "Western" or "AngloAmerican" "rule of law" or liberal democratic political order, much
less a specifically identified "civil" or "common law" system. But it
is an attempt to say that as China undergoes a civilization-altering
reform which moves it towards greater engagement with "the
West," it will probably take more of the underlying assumptions
and specific mechanisms from "the West" than it, as a leading

23. CHING-KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA'S RUSTBELT
AND SUNBELT (University of California Press 2007).

24. He Weifang, supra note 3.
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member of "the Rest," will donate the other way. In this regard,
China's centuries-long experience with legal pluralism and
accommodation of hybrid structures, not to mention a formalism
which may in time prove face-saving, will serve it well as China
develops an entirely new kind of social, political and legal contract.

